

BEFORE THE TENNESSEE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

IN RE: William T. Chandler)
Ward 036, Block 089, Parcel 00010) Shelby County
Residential Property)
Tax Year 2005)

INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER

Statement of the Case

The subject property is presently valued as follows:

<u>LAND VALUE</u>	<u>IMPROVEMENT VALUE</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$83,900	\$246,100	\$330,000	\$82,500

An appeal has been filed on behalf of the property owner with the State Board of Equalization. The undersigned administrative judge conducted a hearing in this matter on June 5, 2007 in Memphis, Tennessee. In attendance at the hearing were William T. Chandler, the appellant, and Shelby County Property Assessor's representative Ron Nesbit.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Subject property consists of a single family residence constructed in 1928 located at 2240 N. Parkway in Memphis, Tennessee.

The taxpayer contended that subject property should be valued at \$285,000. In support of this position, the taxpayer introduced an appraisal report prepared by R. Allen McCool, Jr. which valued subject property at \$285,000 as of August 29, 2005. In addition, Mr. Chandler argued that the assessor of property had not given sufficient consideration to the loss in value caused by subject property's physical condition and location vis-à-vis the comparables.

The assessor contended that subject property should be valued at a minimum of \$330,000. In support of this position, a computer generated sales comparison analysis as well as Mr. Nesbit's own sales comparison approach were introduced into evidence. Mr. Nesbit asserted that the various comparable sales support value indications as high as \$451,200 for subject property as of January 1, 2005.

The basis of valuation as stated in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 67-5-601(a) is that "[t]he value of all property shall be ascertained from the evidence of its sound, intrinsic and immediate value, for purposes of sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer without consideration of speculative values . . ."

After having reviewed all the evidence in the case, the administrative judge finds that the subject property should remain valued at \$330,000 based upon the presumption of correctness attaching to the Shelby County Board of Equalization.

Since the taxpayer is appealing from the determination of the Shelby County Board of Equalization, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. See State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.11(1) and *Big Fork Mining Company v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board*, 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. App. 1981).

The administrative judge finds that Mr. McCool was not present to testify and several of his assumptions were challenged by Mr. Nesbit. The administrative judge finds that the State Board of Equalization has historically refused to consider appraisal reports when the appraiser is not present to testify and his or her assumptions are legitimately challenged. See, e.g., *TRW Koyo* (Monroe Co., Tax Years 1992-1994) wherein the Assessment Appeals Commission ruled in pertinent part as follows:

The taxpayer's representative offered into evidence an appraisal of the subject property prepared by Hop Bailey Co. Because the person who prepared the appraisal was not present to testify and be subject to cross-examination, the appraisal was marked as an exhibit for identification purposes only. . . .

* * *

. . . The commission also finds that because the person who prepared the written appraisal was not present to testify and be subject to cross-examination, the written report cannot be considered for evidentiary purposes. . . .

Final Decision and Order at 2. Moreover, the administrative judge finds Mr. McCool appraised subject property as of August 3, 2005 whereas January 1, 2005 constitutes the relevant assessment date pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-504(a).

With respect to the condition of subject property, the administrative judge finds that Mr. McCool's appraisal and Mr. Chandler's testimony indicate subject property has deferred maintenance in the form of rotting and missing gutters, fallen tree damage at the rear of the garage, and peeling paint. Respectfully, the administrative judge finds that any resulting loss in value cannot be quantified absent additional proof. In addition, the administrative judge has no basis to conclude that the present appraisal of subject property does not adequately account for such factors.

The administrative judge finds merely reciting factors that could cause a diminution in value does not establish the current appraisal exceeds market value. The administrative judge finds the Assessment Appeals Commission has ruled on numerous occasions that one must *quantify* the loss in value one contends has not been adequately considered. See, e.g.,

Fred & Ann Ruth Honeycutt (Carter Co., Tax Year 1995) wherein the Assessment Appeals Commission ruled that the taxpayer introduced insufficient evidence to quantify the loss in value from the stigma associated with a gasoline spill. The Commission stated in pertinent part as follows:

The assessor conceded that the gasoline spill affected the value of the property, but he asserted that his valuation already reflects a deduction of 15% for the effects of the spill. . . . The administrative judge rejected Mr. Honeycutt's claim for an additional reduction in the taxable value, noting that he had not produced evidence by which to quantify the effect of the "stigma." The Commission finds itself in the same position. . . . Conceding that the marketability of a property may be affected by contamination of a neighboring property, we must have proof that allows us to quantify the loss in value, such as sales of comparable properties. . . Absent this proof here we must accept as sufficient, the assessor's attempts to reflect environmental condition in the present value of the property.

Final Decision and Order at 1-2. Similarly, in *Kenneth R. and Rebecca L. Adams* (Shelby Co., Tax Year 1998) the Commission ruled in relevant part as follows:

The taxpayer also claimed that the land value set by the assessing authorities. . . was too high. In support of that position, she claimed that. . . the use of surrounding property detracted from the value of their property. . . . As to the assertion the use of properties has a detrimental effect on the value of the subject property, that assertion, without some valid method of quantifying the same, is meaningless.

Final Decision and Order at 2.

Based upon the foregoing, the administrative judge finds that the current appraisal of subject property must be presumed correct absent additional proof from the taxpayer.

ORDER

It is therefore ORDERED that the following value and assessment be adopted for tax year 2005:

<u>LAND VALUE</u>	<u>IMPROVEMENT VALUE</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT</u>
\$83,900	\$246,100	\$330,000	\$82,500

It is FURTHER ORDERED that any applicable hearing costs be assessed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501(d) and State Board of Equalization Rule 0600-1-.17.

Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-301—325, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501, and the Rules of Contested Case Procedure of the State Board of Equalization, the parties are advised of the following remedies:


1. A party may appeal this decision and order to the Assessment Appeals Commission pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1501 and Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-1501(c) provides that an appeal **“must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date the initial decision is sent.”** Rule 0600-1-.12 of the Contested Case Procedures of the State Board of Equalization provides that the appeal be filed with the Executive Secretary of the State Board and that the appeal **“identify the allegedly erroneous finding(s) of fact and/or conclusion(s) of law in the initial order”**; or

2. A party may petition for reconsideration of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-317 within fifteen (15) days of the entry of the order. The petition for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking administrative or judicial review; or
3. A party may petition for a stay of effectiveness of this decision and order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-316 within seven (7) days of the entry of the order.

This order does not become final until an official certificate is issued by the Assessment Appeals Commission. Official certificates are normally issued seventy-five (75) days after the entry of the initial decision and order if no party has appealed.

ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2007.



MARK J. MINSKY
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DIVISION

c: Mr. William T. Chandler
Tameaka Stanton-Riley, Appeals Manager